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Abstract
This paper investigates the identication, the determinacy and the sta-
bility of ad hoc, "quasi-optimal" and optimal policy rules augmented with
nancial stability indicators (such as asset prices deviations from their fun-
damental values) and minimizing the volatility of the policy interest rates,
when the central bank precommits to nancial stability. Firstly, ad hoc
and quasi-optimal rules parameters of nancial stability indicators cannot
be identied. For those rules, non zero policy rule parameters of nancial
stability indicators are observationally equivalent to rule parameters set
to zero in another rule, so that they are unable to inform monetary policy.
Secondly, under controllability conditions, optimal policy rules parameters
of nancial stability indicators can all be identied, along with a bounded
solution stabilizing an unstable economy as in Woodford (2003), with
determinacy of the initial conditions of non- predetermined variables.
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"If we ran the Taylor rule regression in data generated by the new-
Keynesian model, we would recover the shock autocorrelation process,
not the Taylor rule parameter". Cochrane (2011, online appendix,
p.15).
"We may omit consideration of the transversality conditions, as we
shall consider only bounded solutions to these equations, which neces-
sarily satisfy the transversality conditions." Woodford (2003, p.865).
1. Introduction
Should nancial stability concerns inuence monetary policy decisions? For a
policy-maker (Stein (2014)), the argument rests on three assumptions. First, the
Federal Reserve cares about minimizing a quadratic loss objective function which
includes a "risk" term, given by the variance of realized unemployment, which
depend on nancial market vulnerability. "Second, there is some variable summa-
rizing nancial market vulnerability which is inuenced by monetary policy... The
third and nal assumption is that the risks associated with an elevated value of
nancial market vulnerability cannot be fully o¤set at zero cost with other nonmon-
etary tools, such as nancial regulation" (Stein (2014), p. 2-3). In this context,
the recent macro-prudential dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) lit-
erature compares the outcomes of ad hoc Taylor rules of the central bank "not
augmented" versus "macroprudential rules" augmented with macroprudential in-
dicators such as asset prices and/or households, non-nancial rmsand banks
leverage, credit spreads, liquidity ratios and so on (e.g. Beau, Clerc and Mojon
(2012), Smets (2013), Chadha, Corrado and Corrado (2013), Gambacorta and
Signoretti (2014)).
This paper investigates in a general framework under which conditions the
augmented policy rule parameters of nancial stability indicators are identied
within ad hoc, quasi-optimal or optimal policy rules under commitment to nan-
cial stability. It provides complementary results with respect to the lack of iden-
tication of non augmented ad hoc Taylor rules parameters found by Cochrane
(2011), Komunjer and Ng (2011) and Caglar, Chadha and Shibayama (2012).
With linear quadratic rational expectations optimal rules, the policy-maker
determines optimal feedback policy rule parameters as a Stackelberg leader in a
dynamic game with the private sector. She minimizes a quadratic loss function
subject to the private sector rst order conditions, linearized around an equi-
librium (Woodford (2003), Blake and Kirsanova (2012), Ljungqvist and Sargent
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(2012, chapter 19), Miller and Salmon (1985) among others). DSGE models in-
clude n "predetermined" variables with known initial value, such as stationary
auto-correlated shocks and capital stocks and m "non-predetermined" variables
which are "forward" rational expectations variables with unknown initial values.
Examples here are expected ination, output gap, asset prices, private credit and
so on. Levine and Currie (1987) called a policy rule "quasi-optimal" whenever it
includes constraints for the parameters of non-predetermined variables to be equal
to zero. "Quasi-optimal" policy rules are an intermediate modeling step towards
time consistent policy rules (Blake and Kirsanova (2012)).
With quasi-optimal policy rules and ad hoc rules, the policymaker and the
private sector assume transversality conditions (there are no bubbles for non-
predetermined variables such as asset prices), seeking Blanchard and Kahns
(1980) unique stable solution. By assumption, it follows that non- predetermined
variables are a linear function (with time invariant coe¢ cients) of predetermined
variables for all periods of the model. Then, if one substitutes non-predetermined
variables by predetermined variables in a policy rule with rule parameters of non
predetermined variables which are not all equal to zero, it leads to another obser-
vationally equivalent policy rule with rule parameters for non predetermined vari-
ables which are all equal to zero. The parameters of non-predetermined variables
cannot be identied in a quasi-optimal or an ad hoc rule. In more technical words,
the rank of the dynamic system is equal to the number n of predetermined vari-
ables and the eigenvalues related to m "Jordan transformed" non-predetermined
variables have been set to zero. Hence, in those models, discussing whether Cen-
tral Bank policy makers should augment or not Taylor rules with asset prices or
nancial instability indicators does not inform monetary policy.
If not Blanchard and Kahns (1980) conditions, then what? This paper pro-
poses su¢ cient conditions for the identication of rule parameters of non pre-
determined variables in a general case of Woodfords (2003) and Ljungqvist and
Sargents (2012, chapter 19) optimal policy rules under commitment. These op-
timal rules are "over stable", according to Levine and Curries (1987) denition,
as the number of stable dimensions of the dynamic system (stable eigenvalues) is
equal to n + m the number of variables: it is larger than the number n of pre-
determined variables. The rank of the dynamic system under control is equal to
n+m.
Kalman (1960) dened a controllable dynamic system with linear feedback
rule when a policy-maker is able to move this dynamic system in any state during
any variation of time. A su¢ cient condition for a controllable system is that
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the policy rule instruments can have an e¤ect on all the ("Jordan" transformed)
variables, in particular, all the non-predetermined variables. This is related to
Steins (2014) second assumption: there is some variable summarizing nancial
market vulnerability which is inuenced by monetary policy. In DSGE models,
a subset of a system can be checked to be controllable. This subset excludes
stationary auto-regressive shocks which are exogenous, hence not controllable.
This paper states that if this subset of the dynamic system of a DSGE is con-
trollable and if all its eigenvalues are distinct and stable, then the linear quadratic
regulator optimal policy rule parameters of all controllable variables, including
non predetermined variables (more precisely, their predetermined shadow prices),
are unique, this set of linear quadratic regulator rule parameters has a one to
one correspondence with the set of distinct and stable eigenvalues, and all rule
parameters can be identied in optimal policy interest rules under commitment
à la Woodford (2003). Indeed, testing optimal rules under commitment against
quasi-optimal rules or ad hoc rules is impossible, because the rule parameters of
nancial instability indicators such as asset prices in "quasi-optimal", ad hoc and
time consistent "augmented" Taylor rules cannot be identied, and then cannot
be estimable.
The paper then mentions a very important result for the determinacy of New
Keynesian models with optimal rules under commitment, which is the opposite of
the conventional determinacy criterion for ad hoc rules (Cochrane (2011)). The
conventional determinacy criterion is the equality of the number of stable eigen-
values to the number of predetermined variables (Blanchard and Kahns (1980)).
The conventional view leads to the alternative: "bubbles versus sunspots" (Loisel
(2009)). New Keynesian macroprudential DSGE ad hoc augmented Taylor rules
should not stabilize potential bubbles of m non-predetermined variables such as
asset prices and private credit in order to maintain the uniqueness of a knife-edge
stable equilibrium path, knowing that innitesimal deviations from this path lead
to diverging bubbles for the m non-predetermined variables. Else, there will be
an innity of initial values ("sunspots") for the m non-predetermined variables, if
ever diverging bubbles are stabilized by Old Keynesian policy-makers rules. How-
ever, several economists consider that the knife edge equilibrium is not unique and
that an innity of rational expectations multiple equilibria with diverging paths
(bubbles) are also valid (Burmeister (1980), Cochrane (2011), Christiaans (2013)).
Quasi-optimal and time-consistent rules under commitment may face multi-
ple equilibria and indeterminacy when satisfying Blanchard and Kahns (1980)
condition of the equality between the number of stable eigenvalues and the num-
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ber of predetermined variables (Blake and Kirsanova (2012)). If the system is
controllable with n+m stable dimensions (stable eigenvalues related to "stable"
eigenvectors), there are a number of ways to nd n eigenvectors related to stable
eigenvalues equal to the number n of predetermined variables, satisfying Blanchard
and Kahns (1980) condition. This number is equal to the number of subsets of
n distinct eigenvectors among n +m eigenvectors (Blake and Kirsanova (2012)).
For optimal rules under commitment, there is only one subset of n +m distinct
eigenvectors of stable eigenvalues among n +m eigenvectors. Finally, if the sys-
tem is controllable, the Lagrange multipliers of non-predetermined variables with
optimal rules under commitment are equal to zero at the initial date, in order to
minimize the marginal value of the loss function. This allows to "determine" the
unique initial value of each non-predetermined variable, such as nancial stability
indicators.
Additionally, this paper highlights two useful properties of optimal rules under
commitment which inform monetary policy. Empirical literature documents that
unexpected changes in the nominal interest rate have a signicant e¤ect on real
stock prices and on housing prices (Challe and Giannitsarou (2014)). However,
Central Bankers fear that stabilizing asset prices and credit bubbles may lead to
too much volatility of their interest rate. A rst issue faced by policy-makers is
then to set a trade-o¤ between the policy rate volatility versus targeting nancial
stability, understood as leaning against credit and asset price bubbles. This issue
cannot be informative with "quasi-optimal" rules, as non-predetermined variables
cannot be identied.
A second issue is related to the ability of macro-prudential policy to decrease
the wealth e¤ect channel of nancial instability, i.e. the correlation between asset
prices and capital. This issue cannot be addressed with "quasi-optimal" rules,
because there is a xed exact linear relationship (and correlation) between non-
predetermined variables (asset prices) and predetermined variables (capital) fol-
lowing Blanchard and Kahn (1980) assumption.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 1 and 2 presents identication of rule
parameters with quasi-optimal versus with optimal rules under commitment to
nancial stability. Section 3 concludes with potential extensions.
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2. Identication in "quasi-optimal" rules with pre-commitment
assuming no-bubbles
Our analysis uses without lack of generality the deterministic setup. The certainty
equivalence property of linear quadratic optimal control models implies that opti-
mal rule parameters do not depend from an appropriate vector of random shocks
which can be added (Anderson et al. (1996), Blake and Kirsanova (2012)). The
Central Bank as a Stackelberg leader commits to a sequence of decision rules at
time 0, in a Ramsey problem (Ljundqvist and Sargent (2012), chapter 19). She
minimizes her loss function by nding a sequence of decision rules rt:
max
frt;kt+1;qt+1g
  1
2
+1X
t=0
t
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=  
 k0 k
k
q0 q
q
T
P
 k0 k
k
q0 q
q

(1)
The Central Bank loss function is subject to a closed loop dynamics including
the feedback rule:

kt+1
tqt+1

=
0BB@ Ann AnmAmn Amm

| {z }
A
+

Bn1
Bm1

| {z }
B
 
F1n F1m
| {z }
 F
1CCA ktqt

+ zt (2)
where 0 is a discount factor, kt is an (n 1) vector of variables predetermined
at t with initial conditions k0 given (shocks can straightforwardly be included
into this vector); q is an (m 1) vector of variables non-predetermined at t; z
is an (k  1) vector of exogenous variables; r is the policy interest rate, with a
linear policy feedback rule  F which is a 1  (n+m) matrix; Qij is a i  j
positive symmetric semi-denite matrix and  > 0 is a scalar (both denes the
Central Bank preferences), P is a symmetric matrix (when Q is symmetric) which
provides the optimal value of the loss function, A is (n+m) (n+m) matrix, B
is a (n+m) 1 matrix,  is a (n+m) k matrix, tqt is the agents expectations
of qt+1 dened as follows:
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tqt+1 = Et (qt+1 p 
t) : (3)

t is the information set at date t (it includes past and current values of all
endogenous variables and may include future values of exogenous variables). Ac-
cording to Blanchard and Kahn (1980), a predetermined variable is a function
only of variables known at date t so that kt+1 = tkt+1 whatever the realization of
the variables in 
t+1. A non-predetermined variable can be a function of any
variable in 
t+1, so that we can conclude that qt+1 = tqt+1 only if the realization
of all variables in 
t+1 are equal to their expectations conditional on 
t.
Boundary conditions for the policymakers rst order conditions are the given
initial conditions for predetermined variables k0 and Blanchard and Kahn (1980)
hypothesis ruling out "bubbles", i.e. the exponential growth of the expectations
of w =(k;q; z):
8t 2 N,9wt 2 Rk,9t 2 R, such that jEt (wt+1 p 
t)j  (1 + i)t wt, 8i 2 R+:
(4)
Following Levine and Currie (1987) denition, a policy rule which imposes
restrictions on the parameters of the rule is "quasi-optimal" in the sense that it is
suboptimal in the general class of linear feedback rules but optimal within its own
class. More precisely, the Central Bank is looking for such a quasi-optimal rule
which imposes restrictions on the coe¢ cients related to the non-predetermined
variables. When the non-predetermined variables are excluded from the policy
feedback rule, quasi-optimal rules are time consistent, because Calvos (1978)
shadow prices related to non predetermined variables (denoted q) are no longer
computed in the policymakers optimization. These quasi-optimal rules lead natu-
rally to a third type of rules: optimal time-consistent rules without precommitment
related to discretionary policy where the policymaker recursively optimizes again
at each future period (Blake and Kirsanova (2012)).
Theorem 1 (Kwakernaak and Sivan (1972, p.198)). If the matrix pair
(An+m;n+m Bn+m;1) is controllable, i.e. if the Kalman (1960) controllability ma-
trix has full rank:
rank
 
B AB A2B ... An+m 1B

= n+m (5)
the eigenvalues of A BF can be arbitrarily located in the complex plane (com-
plex eigenvalues, however, occur in complex conjugate pairs) by choosing a policy
rule matrix F accordingly.
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The policy-maker considers only the set of policy rules F (n) such thatA BF
has exactly nS = n stable eigenvalues equal to the number of predetermined vari-
ables, in the hope to obtain Blanchard and Kahn (1980) unique rational expecta-
tions solution. LetM (F) be the matrix of left eigenvectors ofA BF partitioned
so that (indexes represent dimensions of the block matrices):

M (F)nn M (F)nm
M (F)mn M (F)mm

Ann  Bn1F1n Anm  Bn1F1m
Amn  Bm1F1n Amm  Bm1F1m

(6)
=

nn 0nm
0mn mm

M (F)nn M (F)nm
M (F)mn M (F)mm

(7)
where nn is a n  n diagonal matrix of stable roots, strictly lower than 1=
p

where  is the discount factor of the policy maker, and mm is a m  m diag-
onal matrix of unstable roots. Then, the unique converging path is determined
by a linear relationship between non-predetermined variables and predetermined
variables (Blanchard and Kahn (1980)):
Etqt+1 =  N (F)mnkt+1 =  M (F) 1mmM (F)mn kt+1 and
q0 =  N (F)mnk0 =  M (F) 1mmM (F)mn k0:
This describes "jumps" of non-predetermined variables to the stable manifold
generated by predetermined variables. Then, the orthogonalized non-predetermined
variables (denoted q
0
t) with unstable roots are linear combinations of orthogonal-
ized predetermined variables with convergent eigenvalues (Blanchard and Kahn
(1980) equation A6, p.1310). The formal derivation of matrix N (F) in the gen-
eral case including stochastic shocks and when the generalized Schur method is
necessary is presented in McCandless (2008), section 6.8.
If the Central Bank denes a rule on both predetermined and non-predetermined
variables (F1n;F1m), this rule is observationally equivalent to a rule which de-
pends only on predetermined variables with weights
 
F
0
1n;01m

where the Central
Bank imposes restrictions on the coe¢ cients of the policy feedback rule, with all
weights of non-predetermined variables equal to zero. This is detailed as follows:
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rt   r =  F1n

kt+1   k
k

  F1m

qt+1   q
q

(8)
=  (F1n   F1mNmn)| {z }
F
0
1n

kt+1   k
k

; (9)
F = (F1n;F1m) = (F1n   F1mNmn;01m) : (10)
The policymaker only needs to control predetermined variables:
max
fRtg
  1
2
+1X
t=0
0t
"
Q
0
nn

kt   k
k
2
+  (rt   r)2
#
with a reduced loss function with weightsQ
0
nn depending only on pre-determined
variables, which are observationally equivalent to the initial loss function depend-
ing on both non pre-determined variables and pre-determined variables according
to the following equality:
Q
0
nn = Qnn +N (F)
T
nmQmmN (F)mn +QnmN (F)mn +N (F)
T
nmQmn
subject to the closed loop system of pre-determined variables:
kt+1 =

A
0
nn  Bn1F
0
1n

kt. (11)
According to the following equality:
A
0
nn = Ann  AnmNmn and F
0
1n = F1n   F1mNmn (12)
the closed loop system of pre-determined variables is observationally equivalent
to the top half of partitioned matrices of the non-controllable closed loop system
including also non pre-determined variables:

kt+1
tqt+1

=

Ann  Bn1F1n Anm  Bn1F1m
Amn  Bm1F1n Amm  Bm1F1m

kt
qt

with (13)
kt+1
tqt+1

=

Inn
 Nmn

kt+1
kt+1

and

kt
qt

=

Inn
 Nmn

kt
kt

(14)
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The following proposition, initially formulated for optimal policy without pre-
commitment by Blake and Kirsanova (2012), also holds for quasi-optimal policies
with commitment:
Proposition 1: (Blake and Kirsanova (2012), p.1333). Let the closed
loop transition matrix where the feedback policy rule F depends only on predeter-
mined variables: A BF =

Ann  Bn1F1n Anm
Amn  Bm1F1n Amm

have all distinct eigen-
values and be diagonalizable (which imply that the matrix pair (An+m;n+m Bn+m;1)
is controllable). Let us consider the set of policy rules F (nS) such that A BF
has nS stable eigenvalues (below 1=
p
 where  is the discount factor of the policy
maker) and n  nS unstable eigenvalues.
Case 1. For the set of policy rules F (nS) such that nS < n, the number of
stable eigenvalues is strictly below the number of pre-determined variables, there
is no rational expectations equilibrium according to Blanchard and Kahn (1980).
Case 2. For the set of policy rules F (nS) such that nS = n, the number of
stable eigenvalues is strictly equal to the number of predetermined variables, there
is a unique rational expectations equilibrium according to Blanchard and Kahn
(1980).
Case 3. For the set of policy rules F (nS) such that n < nS  n+m, there are
at most nS !
n!(ns n)! ways of selecting n stable eigenvalues and eigenvectors among a
set of ns stable eigenvalues or eigenvectors, with parameters of the rule related
to non-predetermined variables constrained to be equal to zero F1m = 0. Hence,
the matrix N (F (nS))mn based on these eigenvectors is not unique. It determines
the linear relationship between non pre-determined variables to pre-determined
variables:
Etqt+1 =  N (F)mnkt+1 =  M (F) 1mmM (F)mn kt+1
which are solutions of a particular non-symmetric Riccati matrix equation.
As emphasized by Blake and Kirsanova (2012), multiple equilibria may remain
unnoticed. Choosing particular initial conditions for a DSGE may lead to conver-
gence to a particular equilibrium using the currently available software program-
ming Blanchard and Kahn (1980) solutions, without revealing the indeterminacy
of the matrix N (F)mn.
Proposition 2. The following results hold for quasi-optimal rules if Blanchard
and Kahn [1980] condition holds, that is, the number of non pre-determined
variables is equal to the number of unstable eigenvalues of the controlled system
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with the transition matrix A BF =

Ann  Bn1F1n Anm
Amn  Bm1F1n Amm

:
For a given matrix Nmn and if the matrix pair (A0nn B
0
n1) is controllable,
i.e. if the following Kalman (1960) controllability matrix has full rank:
rank
 
B0nn A
0
nnB
0
1n A
02
nnB
0
n1 ... A
0n 1
nn B
0
n1

= n (15)
the following results hold:
1. There is a unique symmetric positive semi-denite solution P to the discrete
algebraic Ricatti equation:
P0 = Q0 + A0TP0A0   A0TP0B0  + B0TP0B0 1 B0TP0A0: (16)
2. The restricted policy rule parameters of pre-determined variables F =
 
F
0
1n;01m

are uniquely determined from equation:
F
0
1n = 
 
+B0TP0B0
 1
B0TP0A0: (17)
3. Non identication of quasi-optimal rule parameters of non pre-determined
variables (such as macro-prudential risk variables) if ever those rule parameters
are distinct from zero:
F=(F1n;F1m) = (F1n   F1mNmn;01m) :
4. Indeterminacy. According to proposition 1, there may be at most (n+m)!
n!m!
multiple equilibria providing a matrix N (F)mn:
Etqt+1 =  N (F)mnkt+1 and Etq0 =  N (F)mnk0
5. Bounded solution. For the optimal policy rule F
0
1n all eigenvalues of the
closed loop transition matrix A
0
nn Bn1F01n are strictly less than 1=
p
 in absolute
value:
i;A0nn Bn1F01n < 1=p, 1  i  n . It follows that limt!+1 kt(p)t . Then, non-
predetermined variables are bounded because tqt+1 =  Nmnkt+1.
6. Minimal volatility of the policy interest rate (  > 0;Q = 0). In this case,
the policy rule parameters are all equal to zero. All the (stable) eigenvalues of the
open loop system A
0
nn remain unchanged in the closed loop system ji;A BFj =
ji;Aj < 1 (Rojas (2011)).
7. Inability of the policies to change the covariances matrix between pre-
determined and non pre-determined variables when Qmn 6= 0 and Qnm 6= 0, as it
is xed according to Blanchard and Khan (1980) condition: Etqt+1 =  N (F)mnkt+1.
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8. Time consistency à la Calvo (1978). As the quasi-optimal policy rule ex-
cludes non-predetermined variables from the optimal control problem, the Lagrange
multiplier related to there variables (at the origin of time inconsistency issues) does
not appear in the optimisation.
Most of recent macro-prudential DSGE models assume simultaneously (1) ad
hoc Taylor rules augmented by non pre-determined variables such as asset prices
and private credit and compares them with non augmented Taylor rules, (2) no
asset price bubbles and no Ponzi game condition for credit and asset prices with
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) condition. These macro-prudential DSGE models
face the same identication problem as "quasi-optimal" rules with precommit-
ment. When analyzing the identication of all DSGE parameters and not only
the rule parameters, the controllability hypothesis is also instrumental in sev-
eral demonstrations in Komunjer and Ng (2011) appendix. Rule parameters are
usually found to be in the list of least identied parameters for specic DSGE
identication analysis, while auto-regressive components of shocks are in the list
of best identied parameters, see e.g. Caglar, Chadha and Shibayama (2012).
3. Identication and "over stable" rules with Central Bank
precommitment to nancial stability
Proposition 3 summarizes the identication, determinacy and stability properties
of "over stable" rational expectations optimal rules (Levine and Currie (1987)
terminology) with Central Bank precommitment to nancial stability, where the
number of stable eigenvalues is larger than the number of pre-determined vari-
ables. Woodfords (2003) famous paper on Central Bank interest smoothing rules
are "over stable" rational expectations optimal policy interest rate rules under
commitment.
Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19) describe a four step algorithm for
solving the optimal policy under commitment. "Step 1 seems to disregard the
forward looking aspect ot the problem. If we temporarily ignore the fact that the
q0 component of the state y0 =
 k0 k
k
q0 q
q

is not actually a state vector, then
supercially the Stackelberg problem has the form of an optimal linear regulator
problem" (Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012, chapter 19, p.769). Step one obtains
the matrix P giving the optimal value of the loss function as a solution a matrix
Riccati equation and the optimal parameters of the feedback rule F "as if " qt
are pre-determined variables. Step 2 seeks an "over stable" solution, that is a
12
stabilizing solution for the yt including all non-predermined variables:
+1X
t=0
tyTt yt < +1, (18)
solving the Lagrangian:
 1
2
+1X
t=0
t
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+

qt q
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
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+
 
kt k
k
T
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
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+

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T
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where 2
0
t+1 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the linear constraint.
First order conditions with respect to rt and yt, respectively, are:
0 =  (rt   r) + BTt+1 (20)
t = Qyt + A
Tt+1 (21)
Step 3 uses the property that a stabilizing solution satises:
t =

k;t
q;t

= P

kt
qt

=

Pnn Pnm
Pmn Pmm

kt
qt

,8t 2 N
Then, predetermined variables, the optimal policy rule  and the closed loop
system can be written as a function of predetermined variables
 
kt;q;t

:
qt =
   P 1mmPmn P 1mm  ktq;t

and q0 =  P 1mmPmnk0 if q;t=0 = 0
rt = 

kt
q;t

=  F

Inn 0nm
 P 1mmPmn P 1mm

kt
q;t


kt
q;t

=

Inn 0nm
Pmn Pmm

(A BF)

Inn 0nm
 P 1mmPmn P 1mm

kt
q;t

To interpret empirical evidence about interest rate smoothing in the United
States, Woodford (2003) eliminates the implementation Lagrange multipliers q;t
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in order to express the policy rule  as a history-dependent representation of the
policy rule denoted 	 depending on the variables (rt 1;kt;kt 1).
Proposition 3. If the matrix pair (An+m;n+m Bn+m;1) is controllable, i.e. if
the Kalman (1960) controllability matrix has full rank:
rank
 
B AB A2B ... An+m 1B

= n+m (22)
the following results hold:
1. There is a unique symmetric positive semi-denite solution P to the discrete
algebraic Ricatti equation:
P = Q+ ATPA  ATPB  + BTPB 1  0BTPA: (23)
2. Uniqueness of the policy rule parameters of all controllable (pre-determined
and non pre-determined) variables F which is determined from equation:
F = 
 
+BTPB
 1
BTPA: (24)
3. Identication of optimal rule parameters. If the closed loop transition matrix
A BF has all distinct eigenvalues denoted i;A BF for 1  i  n +m, there is
a unique pole placement relationship between the set of distinct eigenvalues of the
closed loop matrix i;A BF and the unique solution of the set of parameters of the
"as if q is predetermined" linear quadratic regulator policy rule F . All coe¢ cients
of the "as if q is predetermined" policy rule F - related to both predetermined vari-
ables and non-predetermined variables - can be identied. Then, if Pmm is invert-
ible, the parameters of rule  applied on the pre-determined variables
 
kt;q;t

are also all identied. By contrast, the parameters of the history-dependent repre-
sentation of the policy rule 	 applied on the variables (rt 1;kt;kt 1) are usually
not identied as their total number 2n+1 may di¤er from the number of distinct
eigenvalues equal to the number of state variables n+m.
4. Determinacy. Kalmans controllability condition is a precondition for as-
suming that the Lagrange multipliers related to non predetermined variables should
be all equal to zero at the initial date q;t=0 = 0 (Bryson and Ho (1975), p.55-59;
Xie (1997) provides a counter example where Kalmans controllability condition is
not satised). As the Lagrange multipliers are related to the optimal value function
matrix as follows: z;t = Pzt;the initial values of non-predetermined variables are
linear functions of the initial values of predetermined variables (Ljundqvist and
Sargents (2012, Chapter 19), Jensen (2011)):
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q0 =  P 1mmPmnk0 if q;t=0 = 0: (25)
5. Bounded solution. For this policy rule F all eigenvalues of the closed
loop transition matrix A BF (dening the evolution of the system under con-
trol) are strictly less than 1=
p
 in absolute value. It follows that lim
t!+1
kt
(
p
)
t =
lim
t!+1
Et 1qt
(
p
)
t = 0. Thus the policy reaction function ensures a nite loss and we
may omit consideration of the Blanchard and Kahns (1980) conditions on no
bubbles on non-predetermined and predetermined variables (Levine and Curries
(1987) "over-stable" feedback rule and Woodford (2003)).
6. Minimal volatility of the policy interest rate (  > 0;Q = 0). It is such
that stable eigenvalues of the open loop system are the same as in the closed loop
system ji;A BFj = ji;Aj < 1 and that unstable eigenvalues (indexed by i0) of
the open loop system are mirrored by stable eigenvalues in the closed loop system
having their modulus such that ji0;A BFj = 1= ji0;Aj < 1 (Rojas (2011)).
7. Ability of policies to decrease the covariances matrix between pre-determined
and non pre-determined variables when the policy maker preferences are such that
Qmn 6= 0 and Qnm 6= 0.
8. Time inconsistency à la Calvo (1978). When the system is controllable
and without a pre-commitment constraint, a policy maker who optimize again on
period t+1 would choose an initial condition q;t+1 = 0 instead of the optimal
path decided on date t where q;t 6= 0. The system remains bounded and stable
if ever the policy maker chooses q;t+k = 0 on all following periods ( k > 1): the
policy maker is not time inconsistent in the sense of promoting the instability of
pre-determined variables, instead of their stability.
4. Conclusion
Parameters of nancial instability variables in optimal policy rules with Central
Bank commitment to nancial stability can be identied, whereas it is not the case
for "quasi-optimal" rules. Moreover, Kalmans (1960) controllability condition is
a su¢ cient condition for determinacy and stability of these optimal policy rule
under commitment.
Many extensions of optimal rules under commitment to nancial stability are
feasible. Firstly, all existing macro-prudential DSGE papers including an ad hoc
augmented Taylor rules can be extended with additional simulations of optimal
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rules under commitment. These simulations and estimations would then be com-
pared with the ones of ad hoc augmented Taylor rules. Secondly, robust optimal
control à la Hansen and Sargent (2008), where the Central Bank optimal policy
intends to minimize the worst of outcomes where they do not know with cer-
tainty fundamentals (as in Lorenzoni (2010)), is close to nowadays policy makers
concerns.
Finally, the parameters of the Central Bank loss function should be endoge-
nously determined. They result from a delegation problem taking into account the
bargaining powers of the private sector divergent interests between lenders versus
borrowers and between the banking sector versus non-nancial sectors. Big banks
benet from nancial instability over the business cycle through higher returns
and larger informational rents during booms while being bailed out in case of dis-
tress. More precisely, the legal institutions surrounding the pre-commitment to
a nancial stability mandate should be investigated. Not only the Central Bank
should be independent from government, but also it should be independent from
the private banking sector.
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